Mijn emotionele topografie van de geest.

Referentie

Lemma "Emotion", in: Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, Stanford: The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University, 2007

Informatief extract

"How do emotions fit into different conceptions of the mind? One model, advocated by Descartes as well as by many contemporary psychologists, posits a few basic emotions out of which all others are compounded. An alternative model views every emotion as consisting in, or at least including, some irreducibly specific component not compounded of anything simpler. Again, emotions might form an indefinitely broad continuum comprising a small number of finite dimensions (e.g. level of arousal, intensity, pleasure or aversion, self- or other-directedness, etc.). In much the way that color arises from the visual system's comparison of retinal cones, whose limited sensitivity ranges correspond roughly to primary hues, we might then hope to find relatively simple biological explanations for the rich variety of emotions. Rigid boundaries between them would be arbitrary. Alternative models, based in physiology or evolutionary psychology, have posited modular subsystems or agents the function of which is to coordinate the fulfilment of basic needs, such as mating, affiliation, defense and the avoidance of predators. (Panksepp 1998, Cosmides and Tooby 2000).
To date cognitive science does not seem to have provided any crucial tests to decide between competing models of the mind. An eclectic approach therefore seems warranted. What does seem well established in the light of cross-cultural research is that a small number of emotions have inter-translatable names and universally recognizable expressions. According to Ekman and Friesen (1989) these are happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust (the last two of which, however, some researchers consider too simple to be called emotions) (Panksepp 1998). Other emotions are not so easily recognizable cross-culturally, and some expressions are almost as local as dialects. But then this is an issue on which cognitive science alone should not, perhaps, be accorded the last word: what to a neurologist might be classed as two tokens of the same emotion type might seem to have little in common under the magnifying lens of a Marcel Proust.
Another range of models propose mutually conflicting ways of locating emotion within the general economy of the mind. Some treat emotion as one of many separate faculties. For Plato in the Republic, there seemed to have been three basic components of the human mind: the reasoning, the desiring, and the emotive parts. For Aristotle, the emotions are not represented as constituting a separate agency or module, but they had even greater importance, particularly in the moral life, our capacity for which Aristotle regarded as largely a result of learning to feel the right emotions in the right circumstances. Hume's notorious dictum that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions also placed the emotions at the very center of character and agency. For Spinoza, emotions are not lodged in a separate body in conflict with the soul, since soul and body are aspects of a single reality; but emotions, as affections of the soul, make the difference between the best and the worst lives, as they either increase the soul's power to act, or diminish that power. In other models, emotions as a category are apt to be sucked into either of two other faculties of mind. They are then treated as mere composites or offshoots of those other faculties: a peculiar kind of belief, or a vague kind of desire or will. The Stoics made emotions into judgments about the value of things incidental to an agent's virtue, to which we should therefore remain perfectly indifferent. Hobbes assimilated "passions" to specific appetites or aversions. Kant too saw emotions as essentially conative phenomena, but grouped them with inclinations enticing the will to act on motives other than that of duty.
Twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy and psychology have also tended to incorporate emotions into other, better understood mental categories. Under the influence of a "tough-minded" ideology committed to behaviorism, it seemed easier to look for adequate theories of action or will, as well as theories of belief or knowledge, than to construct adequate theories of emotion. Economic models of rational decision and agency inspired by Bayesian theory are essentially assimilative models, viewing emotion either as a species of belief, or as a species of desire.
That enviably resilient Bayesian model has been cracked, in the eyes of many philosophers, by such refractory phenomena as akrasia or "weakness of will." In cases of akrasia, traditional descriptive rationality seems to be violated, insofar as the "strongest" desire does not win, even when paired with the appropriate belief (Davidson 1980). Emotion is ready to pick up the slack—if only we had a coherent theory of how it does it.
It is one thing, however, to recognize the need for a theory of mind that finds a place for the unique role of emotions, and quite another to construct one. Emotions vary so much in a number of dimensions—transparency, intensity, behavioral expression, object-directedness, and susceptibility to rational assessment—as to cast doubt on the assumption that they have anything in common. However, while this variation may have led philosophers to steer clear of emotions in the past, many philosophers are now rising to the challenge. The explanatory inadequacy of theories that shortchange emotion is becoming increasingly apparent, and, as Peter Goldie (2000) observes, it is no longer the case that emotion is treated as a poor relation in the philosophy of mind."

Creatieve commentaar

Een interessante discussie is die, die handelt over de manier hoe emoties en 'de geest' samen met/van een lichaam (een) mens maken. Bijvoorbeeld het woord 'menselijkheid' dat wordt benadrukt als door een defect aan één van de onderdelen van de concrete menselijkheid, de andere delen door gedeelde smart, 'de mens', soms nog meer mens kunnen laten zijn of desgewenst laten zien/voelen dat we 'zijn'.......

Zelfs als men ooit de menselijke geest neurologisch volledig in kaart kan brengen (verklaren), neemt deze duidelijkheid toch niet weg dat elke nieuwe geboorte iets wonderbaarlijks is. Omdat die neurologische complexiteit nog meer de nadruk legt op het ingenieus zijn.

Er wordt soms denigrerend gepraat of geschreven over het feit dat een mens op die manier verklaren te vergelijken valt met de manier hoe een machine wordt beschreven, het lijkt koud/steriel. Maar ik denk (vind) dat de schoonheid zal groeien naargelang we meer over de 'kunstigheid' van het geheel te weten komen.

Neem bijvoorbeeld een bepaald temperament of karakter, 'de manier' van een bepaald individu, zal niet minder aardig of onaardig worden als men weet waar een bepaald plekje van een overheersende emotie zich bevindt in de hersenen, en welke andere processen er door worden veroorzaakt, omdat het een momentopname is. Een geliefde wordt er niet lelijker van. Een vijand niet mooier!

Een mens is mens door samenspel/werking, met anderen, met de wereld.

Een emotie of een gedachte valt niet zomaar te catalogiseren en te beoordelen omdat het 'daar!', op een bepaalde plaats zijn oorsprong vindt of op 'die' bepaalde manier wordt gewekt. Eenmaal geboren, die gedachte, en er worden weer andere terreinen van het leven aangesproken. Tijdens het ontstaan worden die gedachten gevormd door.......

Het is niet de gedachte zelf die beoordeeld wordt (door zijn ontstaan, door zijn waar?ontstaan).

Bovendien voelt het gevoel mens te zijn, dominant (goed). En dit ten opzichte van de wetenschap dat de techniek/werking te verklaren valt.

De wetenschap maakt het zijn van ons bewustzijn nog mooier.